

**CABLE TO HEADQUARTERS RE MESSAGE TO WILLIAM  
COLBY FOR SOME POSSIBLE TALKS**

**11/5/1975**

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IS FROM AMBASSADOR GEORGE BUSH  
AND IS TO BE PASSED TO DIRECTOR WILLIAM COLBY:

"DEAR BILL:

I HAVE THE UTMOST RESPECT FOR THE JOB YOU HAVE BEEN  
GOING,

I HAVE NOT YET BEEN FULLY ADVISED ON MATTERS OF TIMING,  
BUT NEEDLESS TO SAY, IF YOU ARE AGREEABLE, I WOULD APPRECIATE  
ENORMOUSLY THE CHANCE TO HAVE SOME GOOD LONG CHATS WITH YOU.  
I AM COMING INTO THIS POST AT A TIME THAT COULD BE LESS  
DIFFICULT, BUT I REALIZE FULL WELL THAT WITHOUT YOUR ENDLESS  
MONTHS OF SELFLESS SERVICE THE JOB I AM ABOUT TO ENTER WOULD  
BE ONE HELL OF A LOT ROUGHER.

I WILL TRY AND TO LIVE UP TO THE HIGH STANDARD OF  
DECENCY AND EXCELLENCE YOU HAVE SET FOR THIS JOB AND FOR THE  
AGENCY.

GOOD LUCK IN THE FUTURE, HOPE TO SEE YOU SOON.

*Secrecy*  
DCI/bf ~~SECRET~~

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DATE: MAR 1999

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

SINCERELY,

GEORGE\*

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

**CABLE FROM GEORGE BUSH TO MR. COLBY RE  
APPRECIATION OF OFFER OF SHELTER**

**12/3/1975**

TO MR. COLBY FROM GEORGE BUSH

BILL! I JUST CAN'T TELL YOU HOW MUCH I APPRECIATE YOUR  
GRACIOUS TELEGRAM,

I THOUGHT CAREFULLY ABOUT WHERE I SHOULD BE DURING MY TRIAL BY FIRE.

THOUGH I AM DEEPLY APPRECIATIVE OF YOUR OFFER TO GIVE  
ME SHELTER, I THINK I BETTER OFFICE OUT OF THE EOB. IF I  
WEREN'T SUCH A CONTROVERSIAL CASE I WOULD JUMP AT NEGUR  
OFFER, BUT FROM THE CIA'S POINT OF VIEW I REALLY BELIEVE  
IT IS BETTER THAT I NOT DESCEND ON YOU UNTIL THE  
SENATE ACTS. I HATE THIS BECAUSE I COULD LEARN SO MUCH  
THERE, BUT I AM SURE IT IS BEST FOR THE ORGANIZATION.

I DEFINITELY WANT TO COME OUT TO VISIT, TO MEET THE  
PEOPLE YOU SUGGEST, AND MOST OF ALL CHAT WITH YOU, I WILL  
CALL YOU AS SOON AS I ARRIVE, I AM VERY GRATEFUL TO YOU.

2. IMPDET.

Comment: DCI Colby's offer of assistance to Amb. Bush upon his arrival in Washington. ~~S E C R E T~~

S F G A F T

APPROVED FOR RELEASE  
DATE: MAR 1999

[REDACTED]

TO AMBASSADOR BUSH FROM BILL COLBY. 4

3. CONGRATULATIONS ON A MOST EXCITING CHALLENGE. I AM DELIGHTED THAT THE COMMUNITY AND THE AGENCY WILL BE IN HANDS AS CAPABLE AS YOURS. 4

2. I HAVE ASKED THE AGENCY AND THE COMMUNITY STAFF TO BEGIN PREPARING APPROPRIATE BRIEFING MATERIAL FOR YOU TO MAKE AS EASY AS POSSIBLE YOUR ABSORPTION OF THOSE DETAILS THAT YOU WILL NEED; I KNOW YOU WILL HAVE NO TROUBLE WITH THE OVERALL CONCEPTS. ~~I EXPECT~~ ~~TO BE DROPPING OUT IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS~~ BUT DICK WALTERS IS ~~HELP~~ YOU TAKEE PLANNING TO STAY AT LEAST LONG ENOUGH TO TRANSITION TO YOUR TAKING OVER. YOU WILL FIND HIM A VERY LOYAL, STRAIGHTFORWARD OFFICER WITH A GREAT UNDERSTANDING OF THE PERSONALITIES AND THE PROCEDURES WITH WHICH YOU WILL HAVE TO DEAL. IN VIEW OF THE PRESS HANDLING OF THIS CHANGE, I HAVE MADE A PARTICULAR APPEAL TO THE SENIOR OFFICERS OF THE COMMUNITY AND THE AGENCY TO MAINTAIN THEIR COOL AND THEIR POSITIONS IN ORDER TO PROVIDE AS MUCH CONTINUITY AS POSSIBLE UNTIL YOU ARE FULLY IN THE SADDLE. 4

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

3. YOU WILL FIND THE SECOND LEVEL MANAGEMENT IN THE COMMUNITY AND IN THE AGENCY HIGHLY COMPETENT AND EXPERIENCED. THEY HAVE HAD A ROUGH TIME FOR THIS PAST YEAR AS A RESULT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS AND OTHER EXPOSURES, BUT I AM SURE THEY WILL SERVE YOU AS WELL AS THEY HAVE ME. 4

4. WHEN I LEAVE JOBS I TRY TO TURN AWAY FROM THEM AND NOT BURDEN A SUCCESSOR. AT THE SAME TIME, I <sup>WILL BE</sup> ~~AM~~ AT YOUR DISPOSAL AT ANY TIME FOR ANY ADVICE OR COMMENT YOU MIGHT THINK OF VALUE TO YOUR NEW POST, TO THE COMMUNITY OR TO THE AGENCY.4

5. WARM REGARDS, 4

[REDACTED]

TO AMBASSADOR BUSH FROM COLBY

NOTE FROM PRESS YOU ARE RETURNING WASHINGTON THIS WEEKEND.  
REALIZE YOUR FIRST ORDER OF BUSINESS IS CONFIRMATION BUT WANT TO  
OFFER EVERY ASSISTANCE YOU MIGHT LIKE. WE HAVE ARRANGED A  
SUITABLE OFFICE HERE AND WILL ORGANIZE SECRETARIAL, TRANSPORTATION,  
ETC., HELP YOU MIGHT NEED. IN PROCESS, OF COURSE, HOPE TO INTRODUCE  
YOU TO IMMEDIATE OFFICE STAFF AND SENIOR OFFICERS OF AGENCY AND  
COMMUNITY ACCORDING WHATEVER SCHEDULE YOU CHOOSE. ALSO CERTAINLY  
WOULD FULLY BRIEF YOU ON ON-GOING BALLGAMES WITH SENATE AND HOUSE  
SELECT COMMITTEES AND, OF COURSE, THE SUBSTANTIVE BUSINESS OF  
INTELLIGENCE. SUGGEST YOU MIGHT CALL ME AT OFFICE, 351-6363, OR  
HOME, 320-4646, AFTER YOUR ARRIVAL AND WE CAN SETTLE YOUR DESIRES.  
E2 IMPDET-N

McCull  
BET

2b

January 3, 1976

MEMORANDUM

FOR: The President

FROM: George Bush *GB*

SUBJECT: Suggestions for Presidential Directive to the new Director-CIA

Since our last conversation I have had many intelligence briefings and I have read the various reform proposals that have been submitted to you, along with some that weren't submitted.

I have not felt free to attend official coordinating meetings, not wanting to put any pressure on Bill Colby who has been extraordinarily thoughtful to me. I do want, however, to give you some of my personal views, before any final decisions are made -- decisions that clearly affect the conduct of my new job.

I have prepared twelve recommendations that you might want to include in a "letter of instruction" to the new Director of Intelligence. These recommendations do not require legislation. The list is not intended to be all-inclusive.

I have gone over these with Mike Duval and have talked to Bill Colby on many of them. I have not shown this to Jack Marsh who is out of town today, but he has encouraged me to send my views directly to you.

A personal note: I am told that the Senate is going to act on my nomination soon after it comes back. Barbara and I plan to go to the Bahamas for one week commencing January 7th. Before that and after I will be in my EOB office. I hope you and I will have a chance to visit in person before any final decisions are made. Hopefully, this could be done immediately upon my confirmation.

**GENERAL OBSERVATIONS:**

A. I hope whatever is done will not be too defensive. In my view the general theme should be:

Intelligence is vital to our country. We are making proposals to strengthen it and improve it. The President will see that abuses are eliminated and he will guarantee that we will maintain and strengthen our vital foreign intelligence capability.

B. I think you should move immediately to take certain steps that do not require legislation. This can best be done by a letter to the new Director along the lines of your previous letter to Bill Colby. It can be done at the same time as you propose legislative changes, but in any event it should be done shortly after I take office.

C. My specific twelve points follow.

Point 1.

The DCI will have access to all intelligence information. None shall be withheld from him, and when he asks for any information from any department it will be granted to him. The Director will take the appropriate steps to guarantee that information provided him is kept. secret.

Comment:

This instruction is essential as a guarantee that no Department withholds vital information from the Director. I recognize the sensitivity of high level policy discussions with foreign leaders, for example, but unless the Director has access to all intelligence the estimates presented to the President are not as good as they might be. Procedures can be initiated to guard against leaks; but, in the final analysis, if I am to do this job well, I must have your confidence and that confidence must be expressed through instructions to all concerned to make available to me any information that I request. I feel the same way about so called "series checks" which are indeed intelligence. I recognize that some information is so sensitive that I will have to hold it in my own personal office, but the principle must be established that the Director has access to all information.

Point 2.

The Director will have direct access to the President. The President instructs the Director to give him objective and independent intelligence without regard to any foreign policy considerations. The President expects the Director to work closely with the NSC, but the President wants it understood that the Director will have direct access to the President when he feels such access is necessary.

Comment:

You and I have discussed this. Having it stated publicly will make my job much easier in the Intelligence Community and will allay fears on the Hill and elsewhere about the information being too filtered when it reaches the President. I believe our agreement on regularly-scheduled meetings should be made public.

Point 3.

The Director will be given Cabinet rank, but he will not attend Cabinet meetings unless they relate to foreign affairs.

Comment:

Cabinet rank bestowed by the President will demonstrate the importance the President feels about intelligence; but I should not attend Cabinet meetings unless the agenda is foreign affairs. You would get enormous political flak if I did. The Cabinet rank, however, would help in dealing with the Deputy Secretaries and the Secretaries at State and Defense particularly. It is more form than substance but Colby made the original recommendation and I support it.

**Point 4.**

The President reiterates his support for the Director as his top intelligence officer and instructs him to meet from time to time with the Secretaries of State and Defense as well as the head of the NSC in order to insure the President of maximum cooperation between the producers and the users of intelligence.

**Comment:**

Maximum cooperation between the Secretaries of State and Defense with the DCI is essential to an efficient intelligence system.

Point 5.

The President plans to appoint an additional Deputy for CIA. He instructs the Director to have one Deputy concern himself with managing the agency under the direction of the Director. The other Deputy would concern himself primarily with co-ordination of the Intelligence Community for the Director.

Comment:

This was a recommendation of the Rockefeller Commission that has wide spread support in the Community and on the Hill. I am told it can be initiated without Hill action but legislation will be required eventually because of the "advise and consent" provision. The concept makes sound management sense to me.

Point 6.

The President instructs the Director to renew his efforts in the resource field for the entire community. The President will look to the Director for maximum effort to eliminate waste and unnecessary duplication regarding resources of both money and manpower. The Department of Defense is instructed to provide the Director with maximum cooperation in this regard.

Comment:

Various proposals have been presented to you for strengthening the Director's role in resource control. I have avoided here the many specific recommendations on reorganization affecting control of resources. I am convinced that the Director needs more than this supportive language if he is going to really be a constructive influence in controlling resources. Language such as this Point 6 will help, however. It is my intention, of course, to be in close touch with Jim Lynn on resource control after confirmation.

**Point 7.**

The Director will not have as priority the tactical intelligence field. Tactical intelligence has been and should continue to be the priority concern of defense intelligence. The Director shall be alert to eliminate wasteful duplication in the entire Intelligence Community, however.

**Comment:**

Tactical intelligence really belongs to the military. By down playing the DCI's role in tactical intelligence you help eliminate a long standing irritant between DOD and CIA. The Director can keep his eye on the "big picture" but language such as suggested in Point 7 will be well received by Defense yet needn't result in escalated overall intelligence costs. It simply gives the Director guidance on priorities.

**Point 8.**

The Director should give immediate attention to housing his Intelligence Community Staff in a location separate from CIA Headquarters at Langley.

**Comment:**

This move will be well received by non-CIA elements in the Intelligence Community, many of whom over the years have questioned the Director's objectivity. There is a CIA building on E Street that could probably be used. This move has Bill Colby's support. Mike Duval and I have discussed locating the Director and some of his Community Staff (when the DCI is not in his Langley office) in the EOB. I oppose this, feeling that you will be accused of making the Intelligence Community political or getting it too close to "policy." My own political past argues for location other than in EOB.

There have been suggestions that in order to increase the Director's appearance of objectivity, the DCI should have no operational control over CIA. I strongly oppose these suggestions. I strongly oppose removing the Director from his Langley office and separating him from his only power base -- the CIA itself. I do support having the Community Staff in a separate location from the CIA itself.

Point 9.

The Director is instructed to give maximum attention to cooperating with Congress. Where there undoubtedly will be some matters of difference between the Executive and the Legislative Branches and the Director is expected to follow Presidential directives to the letter when disputes arise, the Director is instructed to work closely with the appropriate authorities in Congress on matters relating to national intelligence.

Comment:

Some language is necessary to reassure Congress. If such language is omitted, that in my view would make the news.

**Point 10.**

The Director is instructed to make a thorough review of all CIA instructions that have been issued over the years regarding guidelines for proper conduct of intelligence matters. He should take any additional reform steps that he deems necessary. Many reforms have already been implemented by Director Colby, but the President wants direct assurance from the new Director that he has done everything in his power to guard against the abuses that have damaged the Intelligence Community.

**Comment:**

Though I don't want to see your letter or your non-legislative instructions dwell on sins of the past you would be attacked unless some "correction of abuse" language is involved. This paragraph should not be read as an appeal for no executive order restricting intelligence community activities. Indeed from your standpoint, I can see the essentiality of some type executive order. I do feel that many of the necessary corrective steps at CIA have already been taken.

Point 11.

The Director working closely with the NSC, is instructed to take the initiative in finding more satisfactory "cover" arrangements for CIA personnel operating abroad. Appropriate departments of government are instructed to give full co-operation to the Director.

Comment:

I put this in here because of the recent Welch killing and because there is an increasing problem in providing decent cover for CIA agents abroad.

[REDACTED] but  
Welch's death makes this inclusion timely.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

**Point 12.**

**Covert Action.** The President instructs the Director that no covert action be initiated without signed formal approval of the 40 Committee and direct Presidential instruction.

**Comment:**

I include this paragraph on covert simply because it is on the minds of so many people. I have proposed nothing new here -- simply a reiteration of the status quo. My own gut instinct is to minimize our use of covert action, saving it for clearly important operations. If you agree a sentence on this would be well received by the critics. This approach is far better than requesting legislation which would lock you and future Presidents into a process which might in the future prove inadequate.

~~SECRET~~

6 February 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Briefing of President Ford  
Friday, 6 February 1976

1. The meeting took place in the Oval Office at the White House, with the President, Brent Scowcroft and the DCI present. This was the first of what is supposed to be regularly scheduled, once-a-week meetings with the DCI. The President read the briefs. He asked what the flap was on our delivery of the NID to the Hill. I told him that the State Department felt we had given too much information and that Colby, before he left, sent a letter saying we would not deliver this any more. Scowcroft seemed willing to compromise. We showed him the Congressional Checklist, and the President thought that was pretty good. I told him we were reviewing the matter, and we might have to knuckle under. The President didn't seem too concerned about that.

2. I brought up the [REDACTED] and there was no real discussion on that matter. Scowcroft said that they were following up, [REDACTED]

3. I filled the President in on my visit to New York with CBS and the New York Times. I told him I was concerned about the newsman question, that it wouldn't go away, and that we might have to take action. The President did not seem to encourage me in suggesting we cut off our contact with newsmen. In fact, my gut feeling is that there may be some resistance there, but I am not sure of it. I told him that I wanted to know whether it was a real asset and that we might have to make the judgment that we would have to give up the asset in order to get fair treatment and fair attention from the press. I told him that the press felt

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DATE: MAR 1999

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that their own sources abroad were drying up because of the suspicion that they were CIA people. Scowcroft was not impressed with this argument, I don't think. Neither took the position that we should not change the policy, but I didn't get the feeling that either was particularly interested in seeing our change it.

After the meeting, I mentioned to Scowcroft the Shadren matter, and he said that he had talked to the woman and he thought the matter was very fuzzy and very weird. I told him that Mrs. Howe had told General Walters that she wouldn't go public and that she had appreciated Scowcroft's call and apparently appreciated my call through General Walters as well.

George Bush  
Director

~~SECRET~~

Top Secret

# Interagency Intelligence Memorandum

*Soviet and Cuban Aid to the MPLA in Angola  
During January 1976*

Declassified and Approved for Release  
by the Central Intelligence Agency  
Date: 2601

Top Secret

NIO IIM 76-007C  
February, 1976

Copy

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Warning Notice  
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved  
**NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION**  
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Classified by [redacted]  
Exempt from General Declassification Schedule  
of E.O. 11141, exemption category:  
5 56(1), (2), and (3)  
Automatically declassified on:  
date impossible to determine

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

228

10 February 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Brent Scowcroft  
Assistant to the President  
(National Security Affairs)

SUBJECT : Soviet and Cuban Military Aid to the MPLA in Angola  
During January 1976

1. The attached Interagency Intelligence Memorandum contains the intelligence community's assessment of the amounts of military aid sent to Angola by the Soviet Union and Cuba in January 1976. This report supplements an earlier report on the same subject, covering the period from March through December 1975. As the attached memorandum makes clear, Soviet and Cuban aid to the MPLA — already at a high level in December — increased markedly in January.
2. This memorandum has been prepared jointly by the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State, and the National Security Agency.

*George Bush*  
George Bush

Attachment

[ ]

cc: The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense  
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Classified by  
Exempt from general  
declassification schedule of E.O. 14176  
Exemption category 5B(1), (2), (3)  
Automatically declassified on  
Date Imposible to Determine

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~~TOP SECRET~~

10 February 1976

INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM\*

SUBJECT: Soviet and Cuban Aid to the MPLA in Angola During January 1976

Key Points

The amount of military support provided the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) by the Soviet Union and Cuba increased markedly in January 1976.

-- It is conservatively estimated that such military support delivered in January alone totaled [ ]

[ ] The January total is more than double the December 1975 level [ ]

-- The bulk of the increased outlays reflected Cuba's vastly expanded effort to support its troops in Angola. During January, as many as 4,500 additional Cubans were sent to Angola, raising the total number of Cuban troops sent there to an estimated 12,000.

\* This memorandum supplements and brings up to date an earlier Interagency Intelligence Memorandum entitled, "Soviet and Cuban Aid to the MPLA in Angola from March through December 1975," published on January 24, 1976. It has been prepared jointly by the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State, and the National Security Agency.

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- Soviet military shipments in January increased somewhat over the late 1975 level. Since January 1, we have confirmed for the first time in Angola such equipment as T-54 tanks, amphibious vehicles, and pontoon bridges.
- We have continued to receive reports that MIG-type jet fighters are in Angola. There is still a division of views within the US intelligence community, however, as to whether MIGs are actually present in-country.

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The Details

1. The pace of both Soviet and Cuban military aid to Angola has steadily increased since September. [ ]

We estimate that during January, their combined sea and airlift moved [ ] equipment into the Angolan area. In addition, as many as 4,500 Cuban troops were moved to Angola in that month. This is twice the amount of cargo and about a third more troops than were moved in December.

Sealift Operations

2. [ ] communist ships -- [ ] Soviet and [ ] Cuban -- are estimated to have arrived in the area and delivered military equipment and/or personnel for Angola in January. [ ]

[ ] the Cuban ships also carried some 2,000 Cuban military personnel.

3. The voyage patterns of Soviet arms carriers calling at Angola in January were markedly different from earlier arrivals. Most ships in January sailed non-stop from the USSR, to the Angolan region. In contrast, most arrivals in 1975 included as many as five different ports, some before reaching the Angolan region and some after, on one voyage itinerary.

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Thus, although January ship arrivals did not top earlier months, the amount of goods off-loaded in Angola or Congo is estimated to have been larger.

4. During January and early February, we confirmed the presence in Angola of several new types of Soviet-manufactured military equipment. T-54 tanks were clearly identified through newsreel photography in early February, and were probably brought into the country in December or January. Also identified for the first time were Soviet amphibious vehicles and pontoon bridges. We have continued to receive reports that MIG-type jet aircraft are in Angola. There is still a division of views within the US intelligence community, however, as to whether MIGs are actually present in-country. [redacted]

5. Cuban voyages to Angola in January were double the December level. Part of the increase was probably attributable to deliveries of military support items such as medical supplies and foodstuffs for Cuban troops in Angola, but we estimate that military hardware and ammunition still accounted for most [redacted] delivered in Cuban bottoms in January.\* [redacted]

#### Airlift Operations

6. For both the USSR and Cuba, airlift operations continued to play an important part in augmenting seaborne deliveries of equipment. Flights from Cuba were also important in moving Cuban troops to Angola. The level of air activities was comparable to the monthly level of flights between September and December 1975.

[redacted] [redacted]

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7. In January, the Soviets flew [ ] flights from the USSR to the Angola region [ ]. These flights are estimated to have carried [ ] military equipment. Airlift operations from Cuba to the Angola region [ ] are estimated to have carried 2,500 troops (in addition to the 2,000 Cuban troops sent by ship) and a small amount of cargo.

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**PAGES 6-9 DENIED IN FULL**

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

25 February 1976

The Honorable Otis Pike, Chairman  
Select Committee on Intelligence  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Chairman Pike:

I hereby acknowledge and accept the terms set forth in your letter of February 20 for safekeeping of the three categories of sensitive classified documents furnished to or generated by the House Select Committee on Intelligence.

As to the first category, pursuant to your letter, the "on loan" material which was loaned to the Select Committee by the Executive branch has been received by the CIA and such material has been returned to the originating departments and agencies.

With regard to the second category of materials, the transcripts of testimony taken from current and former Federal officials in executive sessions of the Select Committee, it is my understanding that these documents will be placed in the National Archives building for safekeeping in the custody of the Archivist of the United States, and that no one is to be given access to these materials pending further instructions from the House of Representatives or Speaker of the House. As you indicated in your letter of February 20 to the Archivist, highly sensitive classified information is contained in these transcripts, and they should be treated accordingly by the Archivist. I am also concerned about any future plans for the disposition of these transcripts. This material includes information involving sensitive sources and methods which I am charged by law to protect from unauthorized disclosure. I would, therefore, appreciate it if you would bring this concern to the attention of the Speaker of the House and request that I be involved in any decision regarding the future disposition of this material.

Finally, with respect to the third category of materials received by the CIA from the Select Committee for storage at CIA Headquarters, we have attempted to reconcile our records of documents

delivered to the Select Committee with the inventory received for storage at CIA Headquarters, and a number of CIA documents are missing. The materials transferred to CIA Headquarters for storage were initially inventoried in cartons by Executive branch representatives on behalf of the Select Committee in the presence of Committee members during the period of February 18-20. Because a number of documents were unaccounted for, it was agreed with your staff that certain cartons should be inventoried again to determine whether the missing documents might be in those cartons. A second inventory of certain sealed cartons was conducted on February 21 with your concurrence and in the presence of Ms. Jacqueline Hess of the Select Committee staff. While a number of documents were found in the second inventory, a number are still missing.

As soon as a complete list of the missing documents is prepared, my representatives will seek an early opportunity to determine what measures can be taken to account for the missing documents. Other Federal agencies are requested to review their records and inventories to determine whether any documents are missing.

The foregoing pertains only to the missing documents. We have no way of accounting for the multiple copies of documents reproduced by the Select Committee and made available by the CIA and other Executive branch agencies. To the extent that the multiple copies are included in the materials to be stored at CIA Archives, I trust that those documents have been stored in accordance with procedures appropriate for classified materials.

The following is a summary of the third category of materials now held in sealed cartons at CIA Headquarters at the direction of the House of Representatives and the Speaker of the House:

Rockefeller Commission Files	:	13 Cartons
CIA Files	:	11 Cartons
Dept. of Defense Files	:	7 Cartons
(1 carton of DoD files labeled: "pending resolution of on loan material")		

ory of documents find that a number transferred to CIA and sealed in the premises of the Select Committee during the period of February 18-20. A thorough inventory of the missing documents was conducted at CIA on February 21 with your concurrence and in the presence of Ms. Jacqueline Hess of the Select Committee staff. A number of documents are still missing.

aterials is preparing with you to account for or locate the missing documents by checking their inventories of their documents.

aterials as we have no way of accounting for the multiple copies of classified documents reproduced by the Select Committee and made available by the CIA and other Executive branch agencies. To the extent that the multiple copies are included in the materials to be stored at CIA Archives, I trust that those documents have been stored in accordance with procedures appropriate for classified materials.

ory of material now held in sealed cartons at CIA Headquarters at the direction of the House of Representatives and the Speaker of the House:

13 Cartons

11 Cartons

7 Cartons

IC Files	:	3 Cartons
(Carton 2 has partial materials from: Treasury, Civil Service, CIA, and Post Office)		
DEA Files	:	2 Cartons
Dept. of State Files	:	1 Carton
Dept. of Justice/Atty. General	:	1 Carton
FBI Files	:	7 Cartons
(Carton 7 has partial files from State, DEA, Civil Service, CIA, Treasury/IRS and IC)		
HSC Transmittal Books	:	<u>1 Carton</u>
TOTAL:		46 Cartons

Unless advised by you to the contrary, we will assume that this breakdown of cartons accords with your records and that the Speaker of the House has been so advised. The contents of each carton have been individually inventoried and Ms. Hess has receipted for the contents of each carton. Copies of these inventories have been supplied to Ms. Hess for transmittal to the office of the Speaker of the House.

I wish to express my personal appreciation for your cooperation in making possible, in the short time available, the transfer of the materials to be held for safekeeping at the CIA Headquarters.

Sincerely,



George Bush  
Director

cc: Honorable Carl Albert,  
Speaker of the House  
of Representatives

~~SECRET~~  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505  
RECEIVED  
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

MAR 10 1976

10 March 1976

94-157

H 32

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Edward H. Levi  
Attorney General

The Honorable John O. Marsh, Jr.  
Counselor to the President

FROM: George Bush  
Director

SUBJECT: Proposed Bill on Electronic Surveillance



Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

1. I have reviewed carefully the Attorney General's draft memorandum to the President dated 8 March 1976. I have also reviewed the proposed memorandum from the Secretary of State to the President commenting on this proposed legislation. My principal concern is that there be no unnecessary diminution of collection of important foreign intelligence through the type of capabilities which would be covered by the proposed legislation. With this in mind, I concur fully with the position of the Secretary of State which recommends two adjustments to the proposed bill.

2. Certain communications common carriers are no longer willing to undertake electronic surveillance based on present circumstances. This, of course, seriously affects the capabilities of the Intelligence Community to collect foreign intelligence. Consequently, I can understand that appropriate legislation may be necessary in order to obtain the assistance of the common carriers in the future.

3. The proposed addition to the Justice bill contained in Tab A of the memorandum from the Secretary of State would empower the Attorney General to approve the conduct of electronic surveillance for the purpose of acquiring foreign intelligence if the target is not a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence. While I agree with this position, it would appear that with respect to certain communications common carriers we will be unable to obtain their assistance without a court order.

CLASSIFIED BY	Signer
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION	
SCHEDULE OF E.O. 13526 EXEMPTIONS	
§ 1.21, (2), (3) or (4) (hereby are exempt)	
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON	
Impossible to Determine	
(unless impossible, insert date or event)	



APPROVED FOR RELEASE

15 OCT 1996



~~SECRET~~

4. The second point raised by the memorandum of the Secretary of State concerns the modification of the definition of foreign intelligence information to change the standard from "deemed essential to . . . the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States." I agree with the Department of State suggestion that the standard should be "information . . . which is of substantial importance to the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States."

5. [REDACTED]

1.5(e)(c)(d)(e)  
1.6(d)(1)(2)(3)(6)

6. [REDACTED]

7. My views, as stated above, are in the interest of the fullest possible collection of foreign intelligence to meet the needs of the White House and other policymakers in the Government, rather than the legislative feasibility of the goals we have addressed.

*George Bush*  
George Bush



~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

① For G-3  
personal  
②

March 11, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with the President,  
Thursday, 11 March 1976,  
8:15 to 8:50 a.m.

Each of the items on the attached sheet were covered.

1. I talked to him about my European trip and told him that I would like to report to him when I get back on the state of play with our foreign intelligence services. I was somewhat worried about cooperation, not by the services, but by people abroad generally, and by the effect that the hearings may have had on our relationships, and though, officially, things were in good shape, there were some indications that some of those who have cooperated with us have been genuinely concerned. I told him [redacted]

[redacted] I would notify Brent if these visits materialized so that the State Department could be informed.

2. China: We talked about the need to get the information from Nixon. The matter was still rather dicey and tense. I showed him the cable [redacted]

The President read the entire cable. I gave it to him to show that China was indeed trying to send a signal to us that they wanted good relations, etc. Following the meeting I had a discussion with Scowcroft and Buchen on Freedom of Information problems that relate to the release of the President's written report from Nixon. The report of the conversations can be classified, but there is some question as to Nixon's observations being classified. To all concerned I keep insisting that we get access to the information. The problem apparently is that Nixon will only talk to either Scowcroft, Kissinger, or me. Time will

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DATE: MAR 1999

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take care of this, and I suggested to Scowcroft that after we receive the written report, this would be a good peg on which to hang a visit to Nixon and we can get the matter back into foreign affairs channels and hopefully out of political controversy.

3. Israel: We discussed the separation and diversion issue. I warned the President that it could get political. [redacted]

[redacted] The President was concerned. No action called for.

4. Senate Hearings: I reported to him that my two hearings before the Appropriations Committee had gone pretty well.

5. Pike Flap: I assured him we wanted to low-key it--get it out of the papers and simply get the documents back. I made it very clear to him that Rogovin would never have said a statement like he was accused of, trying to "get Pike in his District." I told him that, in my view, Pike had changed very much, or at least was under great pressure over the leaked report, etc., so that he had changed now from the guy that he and I had worked with in the House. I assured him we were interested only in getting the documents back and that I would work with the Speaker and would not try to get this matter hypoed in any way.

6. I mentioned possible coups in Thailand, Argentina and Peru.

7. We talked about the building for the Intelligence Community Staff. We are honing in on the Selective Service building, although no decision has been made.

8. The President asked how I liked my job. I told him that I liked it very much, was getting good support, and that I felt the whole matter "would work." I told him that this might come as a surprise to him and that though I was obviously interested in the elections, that I found I was picking up the paper and looking at items of much more direct concern and only glancing at the political content of the paper. I'm not sure he believed this, but it is certainly true.

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a. I told him these meetings were very, very important to the entire Intelligence Community. The President is relaxed and is always most gracious with his time, and interested.

George Bush  
Director



**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505  
**OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR**

12 March 1976

**MEMORANDUM FOR ALL CIA EMPLOYEES**

As Director of Central Intelligence I am determined that the Central Intelligence Agency conduct its activities in strict adherence to its legislative charter, to applicable laws, Executive Orders, and appropriate National Security Council Directives. Only by such adherence both to the spirit and letter of the law can the Agency continue to serve the people of the United States by properly carrying out its mission to contribute to the national security.

A CIA regulation requires that any employee who has knowledge of past, current, or proposed CIA activities that might be construed to be illegal, improper, questionable, or outside CIA's legislative charter, or who believes that he or she has received instructions that in any way appear illegal, improper, questionable, or outside CIA's legislative charter, inform the Director or Inspector General immediately.

I expect each employee to comply with the regulation. You may report any information relating to these matters directly to me or to the Inspector General at any time.

*George Bush*  
George Bush

APPROVED FOR RELEASE  
DATE: MAR 1999

*Accession  
DCI b6*



~~SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with the President  
March 17, 7:45 a.m., Oval Office

PRESENT: President Ford  
Brent Scowcroft  
George Bush

We did not discuss the current intelligence items in the President's brief. The President raised two issues with me:

1. Our reporting on coups. This was in direct line with the Rockefeller conversation I had had. I explained to the President that no leaks had come from the coup, that in our coup reporting in the Peru case we had wanted it on the streets since it was widely known in Peru that there is a balance between time sensitive coups and others, and that we are coming up with recommendations on this but that it was a judgment call. He asked for no action, simply said he wanted to raise the matter because of his talk with Nelson Rockefeller.

2. He raised the question of the leaks coming out of the CIA at the meeting of the aeronautical AIAA group. I told him we had fouled it up, and I accepted the responsibility; and that it was bad because of a certain sensitivity in terms of the Israelis, and that that information was factually correct. He asked about the "Soviet space program being in a shambles." I told him that was not true, but that they had had some problems. I counseled him that if he were asked about this to simply say that he had called me in, told me he was displeased about it, that I had accepted the responsibility, and that we would try to take steps to see that nothing happened again on this. I further advised him that I immediately had gotten a report from the Inspector General.

Items I raised with the President:

1. Pictures of Soviet residence in New York (pictures provided by [REDACTED])
2. The tank firing - news media event - in Lebanon. I read to him from the cable on this.

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

3. I told him we are keeping my trip to Europe very quiet but that apparently reporter Schecter of Time had asked Brent where I was going [redacted]. We're going to look carefully the trip.

4. In closing, I asked him if he was going to be there Saturday because I'd like to get John Newcombe to come down and hit at the White House; he indicated that he would not be there.

George Bush

20505 4/10 (244-6)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

Executive Registry  
76-16987-13

March 29, 1976

REVIEW STAFF

76-0357

The Honorable Carl Albert, Speaker  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Speaker:

As you know, the Executive Branch has been unable to reconcile its records of classified documents provided to the House Select Committee on Intelligence with the inventory of Select Committee documents now stored at CIA Headquarters in sealed cartons. This was indicated to Chairman Pike in my letter of 25 February 1976, a copy of which was sent to you. I am hopeful that these unaccounted for documents may be found by conducting a page-by-page inventory of the documents contained in these sealed cartons. In accordance, however, with the agreement reached with Chairman Pike, these cartons can only be opened in the presence of an authorized representative of your office.

Accordingly, I would appreciate it if you would appoint a representative to be present at CIA Headquarters while a page-by-page inventory of the documents in the sealed cartons is conducted by Executive Branch personnel. I am truly hopeful that such an inventory would lay to rest the matter of the missing documents.

Sincerely,

  
George Bush  
Director



(A)

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FR

GO personnel

10 April 1976

No distribution

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM: George Bush  
Director

Just before 7 o'clock on April 9th, I got a phone call from Ed Proctor telling me that 1000 of the 2000 Syrian troops crossed the Lebanese border from the Damascus/Beirut road. We had three separate reports of this and numbers were indefinite, but they were reported to be Syrian troops. He used the word "uniformed" for one report. I then called, through the White House switchboard, Rumsfeld, Kissinger and Scowcroft and told them about this. I called Kissinger back, clarifying the word "uniformed." I gave no interpretation of this - Kissinger's reaction was it appears to be bad faith, why are they doing it?

At the end of that day, after getting other reports of this and having estimates here that the troop levels were up as high as 5000, I got a call from Oakley at the NSC indicating there might have been a little flap. Apparently, Kissinger called Dinitz and apparently our own NIO, Sam Hoskinson, had not shared the estimate that was conveyed to me by Proctor. I told Bob that when I have information like this called to me from our DDI, I felt I must convey it along. He said yes we should, but he felt Kissinger had gone off and called Dinitz without talking to his own people, and that they then had to call Dinitz to "calm him down."

I have the uneasy feeling that there was a difference between Hoskinson and Oakley on one hand and Proctor on the other. Later in the day I talked to Hoskinson and what I think I detected was the feeling that perhaps I should not have called these principals until there had been better coordination in the building, or in the whole community. My view is that when we get information of that kind, having been seized with it by the NSC meeting last week, I should notify them and I've told everybody that. I'm not sure how big a problem we have on this. Hoskinson and Oakley were telling me that this is something that the Syrians do every once in a while - go down to the customs house and take over. I told

them yes, but never do they do this in the climate where Israel has been watching to see whether there will be any Syrian involvement under such tense conditions.

I am not sure I understand all the byplay, but it is worth keeping this personal private note.

George Bush

DCI/GB/d1g  
Orig - EA/DCI


21 May 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with the President,  
Oval Office, 8:00 a.m.,  
21 May 1976

Items Covered:

1. Italy: [REDACTED] The President seemed anxious to do something. We told him that the OAG was somewhat divided. Our program was [REDACTED] getting the truth out about the Communists. I gave him a paper prepared by Keith Clark. The President looked at it. I left the original and copy with Brent Scowcroft.
2. I reviewed with the President the number of Soviet agents in the United States and the CI presence [REDACTED]
3. I touched briefly on the ruble costing, indicating that so far it did not seem to be caught up into a political crossfire.
4. I touched briefly on the makeup of the new Senate Committee.
5. I went over the briefing item on the Panama security man's concern about the Cubans circulating the Senate report in Latin America, using this as an example to show the President what the totality of the disclosure is doing to us. I also mentioned the same thing was happening in the Soviet Union.

  
George Bush  
Director

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

MLF/MR Date 06/01/76 95-70  
Document No. #32

June 1, 1976

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President,

Jack Marsh called to my attention your concern about the attached advertisement which contains an open letter to you signed by several Members of Congress. The letter suggests that Mexico is in the process of having a Communist regime imposed on it.

The open letter was extensively published about four weeks ago in the Mexico City press. Editorial comment in general criticized this intervention by the colossus of the North in Mexican events.

It should be noted that as the letter states, while there is considerable violence, kidnappings and terrorism, an observer could conclude that Mexico is in serious straits. However, the conclusion in the letter that these events are taking Mexico toward the imposition of a Communist regime is simply not true.

The recent staggering growth of the Mexican population is exerting increasing significant social and economic pressures on the cities and on the rural areas. While persistent migration toward the cities is creating difficult problems for the existing infrastructure, the number of landless and hungry peasants is also increasing. The government, which is well aware of the potential to violence as a result of this situation, is proposing radical new laws for urban settlement and a further redistribution of irrigated land. These two measures are among the most controversial in recent Mexican political history but are unlikely to stop the violence which is currently spreading in the new productive agricultural areas.

Classified by 435013  
Exempt from general  
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652  
exemption schedule 5D (1), (2), (3)  
Automatically declassified on  
Date Impossible to Determine

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629 1998

The controversy and heat of debate generated by these proposed laws suggest that the government's job to reconcile the various interests concerned will not be an easy one. The Government of Mexico views the threats to political stability and internal security with concern. However, these laws can in no way be termed as Communist inspired.

The Chileans mentioned in the letter were associated with President Allende of Chile and are currently living in Mexico City with the approval of the Mexican Government who granted them exile status. However, in no way can they be considered advisors of President Echeverria.

In summary, it should be noted that the Mexican political and economic situation still continues to be stable, but the outlook over the next decade is serious and should be watched carefully by the U.S. Government.

Respectfully,

  
George Bush

Enc.

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TS 209138

Cy # 2

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

1 JUN 1976

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I am taking this opportunity to provide you with a comprehensive report on the status of Agency covert action programs authorized by you under the provisions of Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended, and to call to your attention some of the problems we have encountered in complying with this law.

As you know, Section 662 requires as a condition precedent that the President find that each covert action operation is important to the national security of the United States. It also requires reporting of the scope and description of the operation, not as a condition precedent, but in a timely fashion, to "appropriate congressional committees," including the committees on foreign relations in each House. In practice this now involves briefing seven subcommittees.

Leakage in the course of these congressional briefings coupled with the adverse effects of the year-long congressional investigations of the Agency operations, particularly covert action, is a serious problem.

Along general lines, I wish to stress that this is a turbulent and troublesome period for the Agency. The intensive investigations by both Houses of the Congress for more than a year now has resulted in extensive public disclosures of past and current covert action operations. Some of these disclosures occurred in the course of open congressional hearings, in committee reports and as a result of leaks from the investigative and Section 662 committees. The net result has been unprecedented and unceasing domestic and foreign media reporting on many of our nation's most secret operations. These disclosures have had a considerable negative effect on the Agency's covert action programs and capabilities as well as our image abroad and foreign policy interest. They have caused consternation and concern among our foreign friends and allies and have provided an unending flow of information for the propaganda machines of our foreign adversaries to attack and discredit the Agency and our Government. The Cuban

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DATE: MAR 1999

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Government, for example, has recently translated the reports of the Senate Select Committee into Spanish and is circulating these documents in Latin America. The fundamental point is that these exposures were not the result of badly run operations. The projects were not exposed abroad; they were exposed here. If covert action is to continue to be an effective foreign policy instrument, we must improve the legislative procedures for handling these operations to insure their secrecy. The end of the congressional investigations will hopefully ease this problem. We are, however, left with the threat of continuing congressional leaks as a result of our obligations under Section 662.

Section 662 has been criticized on two grounds. The Commission on the organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy (the Murphy Commission) recommended that the requirement for the personal certification of the President be dropped as the Commission judged it was harmful "in associating the head of State so formally with such activities." In addition, I report to seven congressional committees on these findings. This process directly involves at least 25 Senators and 26 Representatives plus staff members. Moreover, under existing House rules, a Representative has access to committee records. This broad dissemination of critically sensitive information has led to the public disclosure of every new program undertaken. Calls for restricting these reports have come from both the Executive Branch and from responsible congressional spokesmen.

S. Res. 400, the Senate oversight resolution, will not expressly alter Section 662. However, Senators Percy and Ribicoff have stated they will introduce such an amendment to require the report to be made to only the Appropriations Committee and Select Intelligence Committees, but prospects for such a bill in the foreign affairs committees are uncertain. Such legislation would also face stiff opposition on the floor of both Houses.

Some of the joint oversight committee proposals introduced in the House have attempted to deal with the proliferation of reports under Section 662. H.J. Res. 945, a resolution to establish a joint committee on intelligence introduced by Representative Cederberg, would amend Section 662 to require reports be made only to the joint committee and the appropriations committees. Representative Biester's bill to establish a joint oversight committee, H.R. 12618, would likewise require reports only to the joint committee and appropriations committees, although the bill would give the committee veto power over covert actions. Generally, however, the issue of prior congressional notification and approval for covert action has not been a particularly pressing issue, and there does not seem to be much support for such procedures in the Congress. It is clear, however, that S. Res. 400 will not require prior notification or approval of Congress concerning covert actions. This was explicitly stated in a colloquy between Senators Pastore and Ribicoff during floor consideration of the resolution.

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753.9201

serious damage to our foreign intelligence effort has also resulted in the unauthorized disclosure by disaffected Agency employees and other knowledgeable officials of information related to intelligence sources and methods. It is essential to the future success of our foreign intelligence program that legislation protecting intelligence sources and methods be enacted at the earliest possible date, since existing law is inadequate to protect these assets. The legislation you proposed in your message of 19 February would meet this need by providing a criminal penalty for the unauthorized disclosure of information relating to intelligence sources and methods. It would apply only to individuals entrusted with the sensitive information or who gain access to it by virtue of their position as officer, employee, contractor, or other special relationship within the United States Government. This proposal has been introduced in the House by Representative McClory as H.R. 12006, and has been referred to the House Armed Services Committee where no action has yet been taken.

In addition, several bills have been introduced which would impose criminal penalties on persons who disclose information which identifies intelligence personnel. Congressman Michel's bill, H.R. 11365, which has over 50 co-sponsors, would apply stiff sanctions against both Government employees and private citizens who knowingly and willfully expose under cover intelligence personnel. Senator Beall has introduced a companion bill in the Senate.


Under the provision of Section 662, Mr. President, you have made a total of [redacted] Findings on Agency covert action programs. The first Finding, signed on 10 January 1975, covered all major covert action programs extant at that time and other lesser activities such as non-attributable propaganda, political influence operations, operations to counter international terrorism and narcotics traffic and operations to counter foreign intelligence activity targeted against the United States. [redacted] additional Findings were subsequently issued. [redacted]

All of these Findings have been reported to the concerned congressional committees under the provisions of Section 662. Earlier this month I instituted briefings of these committees on the current status of Agency covert action programs. (See Tab A for record of congressional briefings.) Finally, when all briefings on a particular program have been completed, a report has been submitted to you setting forth the reactions on the part of the committees involved.

█████ major covert action programs have been terminated since the first Finding on 10 January 1975. █████

## PROJECT

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


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[REDACTED]

Respectfully,

/s/ George Bush

George Bush  
Director

Attachments  
As stated

DDO/

[REDACTED] (28 May 76)

Distribution:

- Cy 1 - Addressee
- Cy 2 - DCI
- Cy 3 - DDCI
- Cy 4 - E.R.
- Cy 5 - DDO
- Cy 6 - [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Lewis Lapham. for your info.

I talked to Secretary Kissinger  
7PM 6-3-76 re the Brown article.

Kissinger seemed, indeed stated, less concerned about the 'policy' questions than the speculation in the piece about March 2 clash. He felt the Chinese would never understand why we were putting this out etc etc. He was not happy about the policy problems either.

*George Bush*

George Bush 6-3-76

APPROVED FOR RELEASE  
DATE: MAR 1999

4 June 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Hank Knoche  
FROM: George Bush  
Director

*Roger Glenn Brown*

1. The publication of the Brown article in Foreign Policy is bad.
2. We are trying to keep CIA out of "policy" matters. Our mission is to provide intelligence. I recognize that "analysis" provides intelligence, but we must not lose sight of the fact that we should stay out of the policy arena. Certainly we should not be public participants in policy debate.
3. The Brown article has put us into the limelight in perhaps the most sensitive avenue of foreign policy and we will probably be thrust into the political debate.
4. Please lead an immediate review of our policy on publication of articles. This review should, among other things, take a look at:
  1. a. Whether CIA people should publish.
  2. b. The clearance procedures, including levels of clearance and breadth of clearances.
  3. c. Consideration of external factors. For example, in this climate a disclaimer saying, "These are the personal views of the author," clearly does not separate CIA from the fray.

*George Bush*  
George Bush

GB/DCI/kgt/4 June 1976

Distribution:

Orig - Addressee  
1 - ER  
1 - DCI

APPROVED FOR RELEASE  
DATE: MAR 1999

4 June 1976

STATEMENT

Several news stories today referred to an article entitled, "Chinese Politics and American Policy," by Mr. Roger G. Brown, which appears in the current issue of the publication Foreign Policy. Mr. Brown is an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Despite the fact that the article clearly states that the opinions expressed in it are the personal views of Mr. Brown and do not reflect an official position of the Central Intelligence Agency, it has been speculated that the article might be an official "trial balloon" or reflect a softening of U. S. policy towards the People's Republic of China.

The Central Intelligence Agency makes every effort to avoid taking positions on foreign policy issues and discourages its employees from taking any action which might be interpreted as an official position on such matters. In fact, CIA regulations require employees to submit any article, which they propose to publish, to the Agency for its approval. While Mr. Brown followed this procedure, some changes were made in the article by Mr. Brown, in consultation with the publishers, after approval for publication had been given. The Agency is taking appropriate action in this case but wishes to re-emphasize that the opinions expressed in the article are solely those of Mr. Brown.

George Bush, Director of Central Intelligence, has directed that Agency regulations and procedures governing publication of professional articles by CIA personnel be re-examined to insure, insofar as possible, that any instances of this sort that may be misinterpreted are eliminated. This does not mean that CIA intends to stifle the publication of unclassified articles by its employees in their professional fields. It does mean, however, that Agency employees will be prohibited from publishing articles having foreign policy implications as well as those containing information affecting the national security.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE  
DATE: MAR 1999

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25 June 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with the President  
25 June 1976, 7:40 a.m.

1. Briefings of Democratic Nominee: Bush recommendation - someone in OCI brief the nominee, preferably not his designee, but that the designee would be all right under properly cleared procedures. No Presidential decision taken; the President was agreeable to the principle of briefing. I filled the President in on Averell Harriman's offer to help the CIA, should the Democratic nominee make statements that were detrimental to intelligence.

2. I mentioned to the President that the question of [REDACTED] might come up in Puerto Rico. I went briefly over the election results in the briefing paper. I told the President that we had a paper, "an interim assessment," at Scowcroft's desk that he might find interesting.

3. Soviet Grain Storage Bunkers: [REDACTED]

4. I briefed him on [REDACTED] very interested, Scowcroft told him how important that kind of intelligence could be to him in various troubled international situations. Briefly mentioned the SALYUT-5 manned military space station. No questions - just skimmed the item. I mentioned the possible revision of the Backfire figures; Scowcroft urged that these be completed as soon as possible. Scowcroft advised the President that he had told George Brown about this. I told the President about the Keegan flap and how Admiral Murphy had handled the flap by taking Keegan to task for sending the telegram.

5. Puerto Rican Summit: I used the briefing paper and just skimmed it telling the President that a special group had been set up at State and one of our young people who had done a great deal of work with the [REDACTED] data base had been assigned to the State task force and that so far we had detected no unusual movement of people in the Caribbean area towards Puerto Rico.

~~SECRET~~

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6. I briefed the President on our search 180 miles south of Tobruk. I told him further that we were trying to get something started on Carlos based on a wide range of information that we had. I told him that I would like to see action on the part of the CIA, obviously not assassination, etc., but something perhaps with the French or others to bring this man to justice. I said I would take the responsibility for letting the White House know in case there was OAG action necessary and Congress was informed, if necessary, but that at this point we were just taking a preliminary look.

7. Jamaica: I made the simple statement that we were concerned about the charges against the U. S., and concerned about the Caribbean including Vienna, Cuba and Jamaica.

8. [REDACTED]

George Bush

~~SECRET~~

12 July 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with The President, Oval Office,  
8:00 a.m., 12 July 1976

PRESENT: The President  
General Scowcroft  
George Bush

I raised the following items:

1. The report on the CFI meetings, showing that CFI was getting into the decision-making process in accordance with the Executive Order. It was going pretty well.
2. The Glomar, recommending that we come to the President soon with a decision [REDACTED] to mothball it instead of getting rid of it. The President asked if it would have use if an American submarine went down. I told him, yes, affirmative.
3. I reported to the President on the Jimmy Carter briefings. The President mentioned that I should be present at the briefings personally; "at least at the outset."
4. He asked generally how things were going. I told him about the Reston visit, about the fact we were getting less attention. We had made many personnel changes (12 out of the top 16 jobs). Things were rocking along fairly well, but there was still this tendency to expose and to slug the CIA and that, in my judgment, only time would take care of that.
5. [REDACTED]

Personal Note: The President seemed relaxed. He is always very considerate; asked about Barbara; doesn't get agitated; a thoroughly decent man, considerate of others.

George Bush  
Director

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

APPROVED FOR RELEASE  
DATE: JAN 2001

14 July 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

FROM : George Bush

SUBJECT: Notes on Breakfast with Secretary Kissinger,  
8:10 to 9:15 a.m., 13 July, Secretary's Dining Room,  
Department of State (Just GB & HAK)

1. We talked about the Rhodesia paper that [REDACTED] had drawn up. The secretary had not seen it; the subject was discussed later in the meeting.

2. I went down the issues on the attached pink sheet. Kissinger agreed we should keep [REDACTED] He thought this would be good for where we should be with Ian Smith right now. He thought it best to do it in South Africa as opposed to Lusaka, [REDACTED] We did not go into the modalities [REDACTED]

3. On political action [REDACTED] he encouraged us to draw up a paper that could be considered by the OAG.

4. I asked him if he was interested in highlighting the increased Russian involvement in Somalia. He indicated that he had not wanted to publicize Somalia, but that Secretary Schlessinger had. Kissinger concluded that we should "work out a plan" and let them know.

5. I discussed the matter of the [REDACTED] Kissinger said yes we should have such a Station and called Eagleburger and instructed him to go ahead and tell the Ambassador we were going to have such a Station.

6. [REDACTED]

E2 IMPDET  
CL BY DCI

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

7. Kissinger briefed me on what was going on in South Africa-Rhodesia. I showed him some intelligence about a joint fund and where Ian Smith had spoken to a thousand people indicating something was going on. Kissinger referred to an insurance scheme, the UK would be out front, the UK would put forward a guarantee scheme, some land would be distributed. Smith would turn over the reins of government to Nkomo, the UK would be back in Rhodesia for two years. The British want the credit for the plan. The whites would stay. Apparently, Kuanda, Khama, and Nyerere all agree Vorster is on the program. The program must be kept quiet, otherwise if the Soviets find out about it they would try to blow it sky-high.

8. Kissinger also told me that Vorster wanted to see a settlement in Southwest Africa (Namibia) and that they wanted to move the constituent assembly from Windhoeck to Geneva. They wanted to get Swapo to join in. Apparently, Kuanda of Zambia is handling this.

9. Kissinger asked that I set up a special team to keep him informed with the kind of intelligence we gave him on his recent trip. Kissinger was cooperative and very helpful about the CIA.

*WJ*  
George Bush

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Attn: Ex Secy. Borg. ~~Ab. Secy.~~  
B. EVAN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 17 September 1976

NODLS

FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER  
FROM GEORGE BUSH

I DID SEE THAT SLANDEROUS AVIATION WEEK STORY. I HAVE MADE TWO PUBLIC REFERENCES TO IT. ON TUESDAY BEFORE THE CBS RADIO AFFILIATE EXECUTIVES I SPOKE OUT, THEN YESTERDAY BEFORE THE ASSOCIATION OF RETIRED INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS. YESTERDAY'S COMMENTS WERE CARRIED ON TWO OF THE TV CHANNELS HERE.

IN ADDITION, AFTER FAILING TO GET AVIATION WEEK EDITOR HOLTZ ON THE PHONE, I TODAY FIRED OFF A LETTER PROTESTING THIS "SLANDEROUS" COVERAGE. THIS STORY WAS INDEED A DIRECT ATTACK ON YOU, BUT IT WAS ALSO A DIRECT ATTACK ON THE INTEGRITY OF THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS AND AN INDIRECT ATTACK ON ME. THE WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT MAY HELP AND I ALSO HOPE TO ADDRESS MYSELF TO THIS ON "ISSUES AND ANSWERS" THIS WEEKEND. I SHARE YOUR OUTRAGE AND WILL DO WHAT I CAN TO HELP SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE  
DATE: MAR 1999

Will get to you - probably C.Y.

David - This letter is  
authored by STATE  
Officer

~~SECRET~~  
S170 2011  
E120 2011

21 September 1976 G<sup>3</sup>

~~K~~ ~~some~~  
~~for~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: BACKFIRE

1. Mr. George Graff, President, McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Division (McAIR) met with the DCI and the undersigned this date.
2. The discussion centered on the BACKFIRE analysis conducted by McAIR for the CIA. Mr. Bush reiterated the problems that he had discussed with Mr. Sandy McDonnell in July. He advised Mr. Graff that he was concerned with the pressures being levied on McDonnell Douglas because of the BACKFIRE analysis and with the allegations being made in the press that CIA was slanting the analysis and biasing the McAIR work by withholding information. Mr. Bush asked whether Mr. Graff had any indication that CIA had put any pressure on McAIR personnel to reach directed conclusions or whether any evidence had been withheld from McAIR analysts. Mr. Graff responded he had discussed these matters with Mr. Harold Altis and others and that no one had been pressured by CIA. Furthermore, he understood that, unlike the statements in the press, all the evidence had been available to McAIR. I pointed out that because of the [redacted] data, it had been necessary to select [redacted] to be examined. McAIR analysts had participated in that selection process to ensure that [redacted] representative of the different regimes demonstrated by BACKFIRE were used. Mr. Bush commented that if any CIA personnel put any pressure on McAIR to slant its judgments, he wanted to know immediately. Such improper action would result in termination of an individual's employment with CIA.
3. Mr. Bush added that CIA could not survive if it were shown to be slanting its estimates for any reason. Mr. Bush flatly stated that Secretary Kissinger had not placed any pressure on him to provide judgments which reduced the capabilities of BACKFIRE. Mr. Bush then stated that he had discussed this problem in detail with the President and that his instructions were to produce the best objective judgments possible. Mr. Bush then described the National Estimates procedure. He said that although NFIB by statute was advisory to him, the NIE which would discuss BACKFIRE would present dissenting views as well as the CIA assessment.

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DATE: MAR 1999

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S170 2011  
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E2 IMPDET  
C1 by [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: BACKFIRE

4. Mr. Bush said he did not know what position Air Force would take after they reviewed the McAIR/CIA analysis and had conducted their own [redacted] analysis. Mr. Graff commented that in the areas of aircraft performance, analysts tended to personal reaction when another party reached different judgments and then felt forced to defend their previous position. I commented on the briefing that had been given me last Thursday by FTD. [redacted]

[redacted] Mr. Graff agreed.

5. Mr. Bush then got into the subject of Air Force pressure on McAIR. He said that he had information that it had been applied and that he had discussed it with the President, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Chief of the Air Staff, General Keegan, and with Mr. Sandy McDonnell. Mr. Bush added that he understood the problem that McDonnell Douglas faced. He said that the President would take steps to eliminate the pressure if McAIR found itself in a hard spot. Mr. Bush said that no President would tolerate receiving slanted intelligence judgments.

6. Mr. Graff said that two of their consultants, Generals Shriever and McKee, had advised McAIR that the Air Force was very upset over the McAIR analysis. Mr. Bush asked whether they were stating their own opinions or were reflecting Gen. Keegan's views as expressed at a Commanders' Conference. Mr. Graff said it was the latter. Mr. Bush said that Gen. Jones had advised him that Gen. Keegan was not speaking for the Air Force in this matter. Mr. Bush had suggested it would be difficult to separate Gen. Keegan from the Air Force if Gen. Keegan had to testify on the subject on the Hill.

7. Mr. Bush asked if Mr. Graff was aware of pressure being placed on McDonnell Douglas' Washington office by Mr. Jim Wade. Mr. Graff said he was not. I commented that Mr. McDonnell had advised me of some pressure from Wade's people.

~~EYES ONLY~~~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~  
~~EX-1000~~

Page 3

OBJECT: BACKFIRE

8. Mr. Graff said that McAIR would continue to work with CIA. He did not expect any pressure to effect McAIR's business. Mr. Bush asked that if such problems arose, he would like to be advised so that steps could be taken to correct the matter. Mr. Bush then thanked Mr. Graff for coming and for the frank discussion which had taken place.

[REDACTED]

Associate Deputy Director  
for  
Science and Technology

~~EX-1000~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Executive Registry

76-100744

September 22, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

THROUGH: Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs

1. At our last meeting it was suggested that I go by to see Jack Kemp regarding his concerns about the BACKFIRE. I had a brief visit with him today. We did not go into the details of the BACKFIRE study, though I offered to sit down with ~~Mr.~~ and discuss it more fully if he so desired. We did discuss the attack on the integrity of the Secretary of State, the DCI and CIA that resulted from the outrageous Aviation Week story and the previous columns by George Will and Evans and Novak.

2. Kemp accepted the fact that integrity was not an issue and that he would defend us on this. He had been briefed, apparently by the Aviation Week editor and others, who had convinced him that the CIA study was inaccurate. I will follow up on this.

3. Another point: I met yesterday with the President of MacAir, Mr. George Graff. He assured me that MacAir analysts felt that we had not withheld or slanted data on the BACKFIRE study. We are engaged in a battle here against people who clearly are trying to discredit the CIA study. I am considering at some point asking one of our oversight committees to look into these allegations. I am confident such a review would exonerate the analytical process at CIA and certainly would lay to rest these slanderous attacks that are being laid on Secretary Kissinger and indirectly against me. I will consult with Brent before taking any such move.

Respectfully yours,



George Bush  
Director

DCI/kgt/22 Sept. 1976

Distribution:

Orig - Addressee 1 - ER 1 - DCI

APPROVED FOR RELEASE  
DATE: MAR 1999

Classified by [redacted]  
Exempt from general  
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652  
exemption schedule 5B (1), (2), (3)

Automatically declassified on  
Date Impeachable to Determine

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET//COMINT//E~~

19 October 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT : Meeting with the President, Oval Office,  
8:30 a.m., 19 October 1976

ATTENDING: The President  
General Scowcroft  
George Bush

The following items were discussed:

1. [REDACTED] Warsaw Pact exercise: [REDACTED]

2. Reviewed the Castro stories of CIA involvement in terrorist activities. The President asked whether Venezuela had a very active anti-Castro group. I told him there was some activity there, some in the United States, and some in other countries.

3. Briefly discussed China and the demise of the four. The President asked the question whether the attractive, tall (this is by Chinese standards) Vice-Chairman of the Shanghai Revolutionary Committee who greeted him and Hale Boggs in China in 1972 (?) had been affected by the purges.

4. I briefed the President on the [REDACTED] matter, telling him that CIA had not put pressure on INS. The President indicated a certain sympathy with [REDACTED] who had tried to help his country and was apparently under some kind of pressure. He did not, of course, pass judgment on [REDACTED] guilt or innocence.

5. I touched briefly with the President on some of the problems we are facing with Justice, painting with a very broad brush, mentioning a would-be appearance before Judge Gesell yesterday in his courtroom and some problems with the ITT/Chile case. I told him I did not want to bother him with these matters before the election, but in my view we have some serious restrictions on us that we really need to discuss after the election. The President agreed that we should sit down and do that.

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DATE: MAR 1999

~~SECRET//COMINT//E~~

6. The President asked for a short, non-technical summary on  
what we learned from [redacted]

George Bush  
Director

~~SECRETIVE~~

FOR DCI —

(destroy after reading: [redacted]  
original only retained in [redacted] file)

22 November 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting in Plains, Georgia,  
19 November 1976, 1:00 to  
2:00 p.m.

PRESENT: President-Elect Carter  
Vice President-Elect Mondale  
George Bush  
[redacted] (GB)

The following subjects were covered:

1. Personal. I discussed the DCI situation, expressing my strong view that the DCI should have direct access to the President; that the President should have confidence in the DCI; and that the organization at CIA and the Community would be strongly supportive of the President. (ITEM I - oral and notes)

2. Electronic Surveillance. I briefed according to the Tab B and the briefing paper entitled, "Warrantless Electronic Surveillance." I did not fully utilize Tab B, but did cover points 1 through 4 in the Tab B Summary in Warrantless Electronic Surveillance paper. (ITEM II)

BRIEFING paper  
held in IC Staff  
(Adm. Showers)

3. Sensitive Human Collection Matters. I briefed according to attached papers (IIIA and IIIB). I showed the President-Elect the [redacted] report dated 8 September 1976. He simply glanced at it. I emphasized that people's lives were at stake and covered all of the substance in the summary sheet and in the talking paper (IIIA).

On IIIB, I covered, under Data, paragraphs 1 through 3. (N.B. I forgot to cover the [redacted] series during this briefing, but at the very end of the intelligence briefing in

XEROX to DDC/DOI

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DATE: MAR 1999

E2 IMPDET  
C1 By [redacted]

his living room, I pulled the President-Elect aside, showed him a [REDACTED] message [REDACTED] and linked the sensitivity of [REDACTED] with the sensitivity of [REDACTED]. During the private briefing, I emphasized over and over again the need for full security and the very limited distribution that we give this kind of intelligence.

4. Middle East. I generally followed the outline of IVa. I emphasized that CIA had very special direct contacts in the Middle East. I discussed the growing feeling at the Agency, which is shared by Secretary Kissinger, of an uneasiness in the Middle East. I told the President-Elect that if it would be useful to him, I would be glad to take a trip to stress "continuity" or any other theme that would be useful to him. I told him that Kissinger felt that this trip had some merit and perhaps they could discuss it when Kissinger comes to Plains on November 20th. There was no reference to the Brookings Institution study referred to in Paragraph 4 of Alan Wolfe's briefing paper.

C/NE GRANU  
BAGGED.

I briefed him on the MIG-23 exploitation project in accordance with the cable, IVb (attached).

5. I showed the President-Elect the President's Daily Brief. I told him of its limited distribution and told him that on the instruction of President Ford we were prepared to furnish him with this kind of material starting immediately. This was later discussed in the full briefing session. (REDACTED) (ITEM IV)

ITEM IV,  
PDB returned  
to WHSS-  
(Rebunk)

6. I briefed him generally on Agee, using cable (VI) as a guide, although I did not go into all of that detail. I did make clear that Agee had Soviet and DGI contacts, that he was being thrown out of England by the British, that I was concerned what would happen if he came back to this country and tried to get across to the President-Elect that Agee was not simply a disenchanted former CIA employee who wanted to clean up the Agency. Rather he was something much more sinister.

DOO advised,  
Memory of  
prior passage

7. Palestine Liberation Organization. I briefed the President-Elect, using my memo to Secretary Kissinger (VII).

8. [REDACTED]

9. FBIS. I handed the President-Elect an unclassified FBIS report, "Foreign Press Reactions to the Election of President-Elect Carter," or a title something close to this. } ITEM 9, <sup>4</sup> <sub>left</sub> Carter

10. Shadrin. I briefed on Shadrin. I did not go into detail on the operation. I warned him that he could be contacted by Mrs. Shadrin or Mr. Copaken and that should this happen, we would be glad to furnish him more detail. I just touched generally on the Shadrin case. I did tell Mr. Carter that President Ford had seen Mrs. Shadrin. The matter was left that if he needed more information he would contact us. } CKT advised (ITEM X)

11. Panama. I showed the President-Elect the [REDACTED] cable, [REDACTED] He read it. I further told him that [REDACTED] had recommended to Torrijos that President-Elect Carter come to Panama immediately after he assumed office, and told him Torrijos had rejected this proposal to visit Panama. } E/CA advised (ITEM XI)

12. St. John's Church. I gave the President-Elect a personal letter from John Harper, asking the President-Elect to worship at St. John's Church. The President-Elect said he felt sure that he would be able to do this. } (ITEM XII)

#### General Comments

As I look back on it, there is one strange thing. There was no comment and almost no questions during the entirety of the briefing above. The briefing lasted almost an hour, covered a list of highly sensitive subjects and the President-Elect never indicated that he thought these operations were good or bad, that he was surprised or unsurprised. He registered no emotion of any kind, asked for little follow-up and frankly seemed a little impatient at the end of my presentation of these items. Perhaps it was because he knew that there was a full plate waiting for him in the next room of several more hours of briefings. I am unable to give an opinion at this juncture as to whether the President-Elect plans major reorganization of the Intelligence Community, whether he supports human intelligence or not, whether he was pleased that we have these special arrangements and that we have such excellent sourcing. I frankly just don't know.

~~TOP SECRET~~  
Addendum to Carter Briefing.

I emphasized the need to be very careful using the telephone. I gave him some indication of the Soviet capabilities to read phone calls, to copy thermofax transmissions and to penetrate in many ways.

Later in the major briefing, I mentioned Mrs. Luce's phone call, urging that Carter or some one of his people, meet with Andreotti because of the critical situation in Italy. President-Elect Carter turned to Mondale and suggested that he might have such a meeting.

ADDENDUM  
DATE 3/1981  
XEROX 200/001

ITEM XIII

George Bush  
Director

*Attachment:*

**HANDWRITTEN NOTE FROM GEORGE BUSH RE  
RESIGNATION FROM CIA**

**11/28/1976**

Sent to: The Honorable Daniel K. In

Executive Registry

16-4075

X Ref 77-6006

11-28-72  
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Dear Dan,

Those were  
very generous comments  
you made about me  
when it was announced  
I would leave Jan. 20<sup>th</sup>.  
I am very grateful  
to you:

I will miss CIA.  
I love the people

APPROVED FOR RELEASE  
DATE: MAR 1999

DCT

live with the work,  
too, but for reasons  
you and I discussed  
it is best I go.

I have enjoyed  
working with you.  
Your leadership has  
brought a whole  
new meaning <sup>to</sup>  
"oversight". The  
ugly mood of an  
"adversary" leadership

has given way (3)  
to oversight that  
was both  
being vigilant to detect  
things that might be  
going on go wrong  
and most important  
being alert to ways  
to improve and strengthen  
our intelligence.

Thanks again  
for that kind  
public comment.

Second, by

DCI/GB/28 Nov. 1976

Distribution:

Orig - Addressee  
1 - DCI  
1 - OLC  
1 - ER

~~SECRET//COMINT//TVA~~

2 December 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with the President,  
Oval Office, 1 December 1976,  
9:00 to 9:30 a.m.

PRESENT: The President  
General Scowcroft  
George Bush

The following subjects were discussed:

1. Mexico: I briefed per the briefing paper attached. The President expressed his concern about Echeverria and indicated that he would not favor him for Secretary General of the United Nations. Clearly, we ought to not let that happen. Discussion ensued about UN procedures in the Security Council, etc.
2. OPEC: Briefed using the OPEC briefing paper, concluding with our feeling that price rise would probably be about 10 percent, and I told the President of the impact that would have on the U. S.
3. Glomar Explorer: I stated to the President that we had leveled, and that the Time magazine story which was out yesterday was totally false.
4. MIG-23 Exploitation: Per [redacted] memo (30 November 1976), I briefed on the competitive analysis situation stating that they would be in to see the President, and clued him in on the situation regarding Team A and Team B. The President indicated that he was concerned about the leaks coming out of the Pentagon on such things as civil defense, anti-Soviet ability to knock out satellites, Backfire, etc. He indicated that if the Pentagon had cooperated, they would have had a much better chance for a SALT agreement.

Those were the only items covered.

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DATE: MAR 1998

  
George Bush  
Director

~~SECRET//COMINT//TVA~~

(S87)

~~Secret~~



## Latin American Trends

### STAFF NOTES

Declassified and  
Approved for Release  
July 2000

~~Secret~~

December 6, 1976

359

~~SECRET~~Chile: Progress on Human Rights

Our judgment that the Chilean government has achieved a substantial breakthrough on the human rights front by its release of political prisoners is being reaffirmed by the evidence collected by some of the junta's most persistent critics. 150

actions to empty the prisons have gone a long way toward resolving the controversy over political prisoners.

There has been a sharp decline in the number of prisoners held by the government. Most of those being tried or serving sentences are actually out on bail, on parole, or under house arrest. The government is taking steps to commute the sentences of many persons already convicted; some 1,110 have been granted permission to go into exile and about 800 of these have already left the country.

Despite allegations by local communists and Radio Moscow that many persons recently freed have been rearrested and that unidentified bodies have appeared in the Santiago morgue, there have been no new instances of illegal detention or disappearances. Although there are still pending cases of unsolved disappearances, security forces do not appear to be engaged in the kinds of human

December 6, 1976

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rights violations that earlier aroused international condemnation.

Adding to signs of a more liberal trend is [redacted] that local military zone commanders are reducing sentences under the discretionary powers authorized by the state of siege. One regional commander [redacted] that the number of persons detained in his province had diminished from 165 to 2 within the past year.

[redacted] further moves to "normalize" Chile will be taken as conditions warrant. It is very possible that President Pinochet is getting--and heeding--advice to ease up on the tough security restrictions in force since the coup. Members of the newly formed Council of State may be instrumental in this respect. Moreover, there is some information to suggest that the influence of hardliners in the government has decreased and that Pinochet now thinks a new approach is justified by domestic tranquility and the high cost of Chile's international isolation. [redacted] 1.50

December 6, 1976

-4-

~~SECRET~~

The Director  
Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

January 19, 1977

To My Fellow Employees:

It's time to go now, and yet it seems as if I have just begun.

First, I want to say Thank You to all. I have never been associated with any institution that gives its leadership more cooperation and more support. I wish I could thank each of you personally.

As I leave the Agency and the Intelligence Community there are a few personal observations I would like to make.

First, I believe it is essential that the American people give this Agency its full and unqualified support. The world we live in demands no less. The support for the Agency was shaken during the height of the public hearings in 1975. It was shaken, not only because of a handful of abuses that did take place and which indeed had been remedied before the hearings took place; but also it was shaken even more by the endless stream of allegations which were untrue but which were given great attention.

This is changing now, and it is changing for the better. We are still slugged at times with unfair criticism, but the sensationalism is giving way now to legitimate inquiry; the adversary relationship with Congress has given way to thorough and constructive oversight; the frantic search for reorganization and dismantlement has given way to a legitimate search for ways to improve things.

It is essential that CIA continue to work with the Congress, with the rest of the Executive Branch, and to some degree with the public, to demonstrate that CIA the Reality is very different from CIA the Myth. We are cooperating fully with all concerned; and this is bound to result in the Truth. We honor the Truth; we do not fear it.

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DCE


Secondly, we should continue to strive for fair and better legislation to protect sources and methods of obtaining intelligence. We should do all we possibly can to guard against unauthorized leaks, and I strongly urge that we have a reawakening of the need for present and past employees to honor their security commitments. No foreign intelligence organization can be run without careful adherence to security, and we should be ever mindful of the fact that security is everyone's job.

Thirdly, I am pleased with the way the President's Executive Order has been faithfully implemented. All components have cooperated fully. As a result we are operating within the guidelines--guidelines designed to safeguard the rights of private citizens. To deserve the confidence of the American people, we must continue to operate, as we are now, within the law, responsive to Congressional and Executive oversight. I congratulate all for working to make the Executive Order effective.

Lastly, a word about the Dedication here. I have been privileged to serve in many fascinating assignments in public and private life, but nowhere else have I ever encountered the same degree of unselfish dedication to country as I have encountered here at CIA. I thank each and every one of you for the cooperation you have given me over the past year. I know you will give our new Director the same support you have given me.

I am leaving CIA now, but I take with me many happy memories. Even the tough, unsolved problems don't seem so awesome; for they are overshadowed by our successes and by the fact that we do provide the best foreign intelligence in the world. I am leaving, but I am not forgetting. I hope I can find some ways in the years ahead to make the American people understand more fully the greatness that is CIA.

Sincerely,

  
George Bush

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

72-25-0

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

19 January 1977

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

I am forwarding herewith the 1977 Director of Central Intelligence Report on the Intelligence Community, copies of which are also being sent to certain Committees of the Congress, members of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and other key elements of the Government concerned with the intelligence function.

In this letter of transmittal to you I want to set forth some of my own views on those issues which have most concerned me during this past year. First is my firm conviction that the country absolutely requires a strong Intelligence Community, a strong Central Intelligence Agency, clear recognition of their essentiality, and support for them throughout the Government and in the Nation at large.

This conviction is supported by the issues posed by an uncertain and complex international environment which includes increasing Soviet military capabilities, serious problems such as nuclear proliferation and terrorism, dependence for critical raw materials upon nations and regions where increasing instabilities are present, and global political, military, and economic interdependencies calling for difficult interdisciplinary assessments on our part.

My involvement with this whole range of issues, and many more, has given me deep pride in the dedication of the intelligence professionals who do so well all that we have asked of them. They have struggled successfully through some turbulent times, and their effectiveness has held up.

~~CLASSIFIED BY *Logan*~~  
~~EXCERPT FROM COMINT COMINT INFORMATION~~  
~~SCHEDULE OF COMINT INFORMATION CAT. GROUP~~  
~~8 (SAC, CIO, COMINT or COMINT Director or more)~~  
~~NOTIFICATIONALLY RELEASED ON~~

APPROVED FOR RELEASE  
DATE: MAR 1999

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Despite the inevitable impact of continual bad publicity on morale, people have carried on and given us really magnificent support. They deserve our thanks and our respect. I have been especially gratified that during these traumatic times there has developed a growing sense of community among the various elements and departments that make up our intelligence effort. I have enjoyed the excellent personal relationships with the cabinet secretaries and other senior officials involved, and the enhanced sense of shared purpose on the part of our organizations.

An important part of my ability to do my job has been the access you have granted me and the support you have provided. I am convinced that no Director of Central Intelligence can do his job properly without that kind of relationship with the President. Not only has it made it possible for me to be more effective in providing overall direction to the Community, but it has also helped greatly in improving the image of the Intelligence Community on the part of the public.

Our relations with the Congress, and the forthcoming and cooperative response of elements of the Community to oversight and guidance from both Executive and Legislative Branches, have also helped greatly to modify unfavorable attitudes. We must keep up the momentum in thus improving public and Congressional perceptions.

Your Executive Order of last February enhanced our ability to manage the Community a great deal. The Committee on Foreign Intelligence which it established, the only mechanism we have ever had for overseeing the Intelligence Community budget and resource allocations, allowed us to carry out our responsibilities in this regard. But it needs strengthening to provide the DCI, and Chairman of the CFI, and his Intelligence Community Deputy when he so designates, more direct access to program managers on resource matters. The current requirement that everything relating to Defense-administered programs funnel through the Deputy Secretary of Defense before getting to the program managers within DoD has proven to be barely workable. We were able to get the job done in spite of this, but it was a most difficult chore, and unnecessarily so.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The job we did was to provide for the first time comprehensive resource control of the overall National Foreign Intelligence Program. The resultant program will meet the nation's needs for good and timely intelligence. This represents, I believe, an excellent investment. Dollars spent on sound intelligence permit us to use our national resources more wisely, to provide only for the national security forces we really need, and to play a more creative and responsible role in building a better world.

I strongly support a strengthened role for the Director of Central Intelligence as an essential aspect of maintaining the continued effectiveness, accountability, and economical operation of the Intelligence Community.

In particular I wish to note the special character of the multiple role of the DCI as principal foreign intelligence advisor to the President, coordinator of the Intelligence Community, and Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. This latter role is, in my view, an essential element of his capability to perform effectively in the other two, providing him with an independent analytical resource, a worldwide operational network which enhances his currency and value as advisor to the President, and an institutional base of the kind which prevents his becoming isolated from the real problems and concerns of elements of the Community. To ensure that these multiple roles remain advantages rather than become burdens, I would very much like to see enacted into law the legislative proposal previously forwarded making statutory provision for the Deputy DCI for the Intelligence Community.

As for the question of legislation in general, I am wary of opening reconsideration of the National Security Act of 1947 and the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949. In the current Congress I believe this could very well lead to placing of additional restrictions on intelligence operations, restrictions which would seriously hamper the effectiveness of our intelligence effort. I recognize that the Congress may push for charter legislation anyway, and of course we should be prepared to respond constructively to any legislative proposal, but I would not at this time seek such legislation nor encourage those who favor it.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

In dealing with the Congress, I know you are aware of the heavy burden on executive time and concern which has been the result of interacting with seven separate Congressional Committees. I hope that we will be able to look forward in the future to dealing with a single joint select committee. Not only will this prove more efficient and manageable in terms of responding to legitimate Congressional concerns, but it will also greatly enhance the prospects for avoiding inadvertent leaks of classified material.

I am extremely concerned about the whole matter of leaks of classified information and the impact it has on my ability to protect sensitive intelligence sources and methods, as I am charged to do by law. I feel strongly about the need for legitimate secrecy. At present we are almost impotent in the face of damaging leaks. We need to face up to that, and to try to find ways to deal with it. We badly need legislation that will make it possible for us to meet our responsibilities in this realm.

We also must act to strengthen our capabilities and performance in the matter of counterintelligence. We have, in my view, gone too far in restricting counterintelligence activities we need for our own protection. Legitimate functions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in particular have been dangerously hampered.


I also favor reconsideration of the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act to provide relief for some agencies having a legitimate need for greater secrecy, notably the CIA. The numerous effective oversight mechanisms now functioning provide the protection for rights of our citizens which are essential; we should not find it necessary to go further and in so doing deprive ourselves of vital intelligence.

One aspect of our business which appears likely to continue to be contentious is that of covert action. I want to record my strong feeling that our country must have this capability when it needs it, given the world we live in. The control and review mechanisms which you have provided are the most stringent and responsible we have ever had, and provide strong guarantees that the capability will be employed only when necessary and carefully controlled. Your support - paralleled by the support of the great majority of legislative and public opinion - has been critical to the maintenance of this capability.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

In sending you this annual report, I have wanted to reemphasize to you personally my views on these key aspects of our intelligence effort. And finally, Mr. President, I want to express my appreciation of the trust you have placed in me and the support you have provided to me and the entirety of the Intelligence Community. Serving under your leadership has been an uncommon privilege and pleasure.

Respectfully,



George H. Bush

Attachment  
As stated

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~